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anthropology to enable them to understand many aspects of social life which had not been addressed by political or intellectual history, and yet later proved equally intractable to the quantitative methods of early social history. In both cases, social historians have consumed anthropological theories and rubrics too uncritically, little realizing the possibility that interdisciplinary collaboration should leave neither of the constituent disciplines untouched. In this paper I will use the critical perspective of this volume, focussing on everyday forms 1. Greenblatt's (1988) transformation of Kafka. I am grateful to my colleagues in history and anthropology at the University of Michigan for their comments in seminars when I delivered this paper. I am also particularly indebted to Val Daniel, Geoff Eley, Steven Mullaney, Gyan Prakash, and Sherry Ortner. of resistance, to critique both anthropological assumptions about ritual and historical reifications of these assumptions. In taking "ritual" as my subject, I will also argue that too often the combination of the key terms "everyday" and "resistance" leads us to look for new arenas where resistance takes place rather than also realizing that there are many old arenas also brimming with resistance. Finally, I seek to suggest that our old theories of either "resistance" or "the political" are not all that are at risk in this enterprise, but also the underlying presuppositions of order that undergird and normalize even such potentially radical undertakings as this volume (or this paper).
Ritual is a term that sanctifies and marks off a space and a time of special significance. Ritual may be part of everyday life, but it is fundamentally opposed to "the everyday."
Anthropologists have typically identified ritual as a moment and an arena in which meaning is cathected and crystallized, in which social experience is distilled and displayed. As summarized by Geertz, Durkheim and Robertson-Smith set the terms of anthropological discourse on ritual by emphasizing the manner in which ritual "reinforce(s1 the traditional social ties between individuals (...I the social structure of a group is strengthened and perpetuated through the ritualistic or mythic symbolization of the underlying social values upon which it rests (1973, 1421." Rituals are thus seen as embodying the essence of culture, "as 3 dramatizing the basic myths and visions of reality, the basic values and moral truths, upon which ... (the)... world rests." (Ortner, characterizing Singer's view, 1978,l) . This is not to say that anthropologists have always treated ritual as static.
In her first book Ortner (showing Geertz' influence) clarifies that while she says that rituals "dramatize basic assumptions of fact and value in the culture" she in fact is coding a more complex assertion, namely that "such 'fundamental assumptions' are actually constructed, or reconstructed, and their fundamentality reestablished, in the course of the rituals themselves (p. 2 ) . " Nonetheless, as her more current work indicates (Ortner forthcoming) , this earlier clarification reflected a particular moment in anthropology when Durkheimian assumptions about meaning and ritual were being reevaluated but left basically unchallenged. Ritual might have been viewed as a process that was profoundly integrated into the complex and shifting social worlds of anthropological subjects, but ritual was still the principal site of cultural construction, and culture was fundamentally about shared meanings and social values.
Interestingly, some years later, when summarizing theoretical developments in anthropology since the sixties, Ortner (1984) noted that ritual had been shifted from center stage by new concerns in anthropology with practice and everyday life. This new call to practice has been part of a general move away from traditional subjects such as kinship and ritual, or at least away from traditional approaches to these subjects. And 4 history, viewed more as process than as chronology, is fundamental to this new concern with practice. The movement towards history and practice is not motivated, as the movement towards anthropology was for a time among historians, with a concern about a paucity of meaning and culture, but rather just the opposite; there has been a sense that studies of meaning had become too aestheticized, too abstracted from the everyday contexts in which meanings are produced, reproduced, and manipulated. Nonetheless, even calls for practice oriented anthropologies from such theorists as Bourdieu confirm the residual centrality of the cultural: in Bourdieu's (1982) theoretical proposals capital is now modified by the adjective symbolic.
In recent years as social history has become increasingly anthropologized, historians have appropriated ritual as a subject and employed anthropological perspectives on ritual. William Sewell (1980) invoked a Geertzian conception of ritual to demonstrate that ritual performances --in his particular story rituals that employed old regime forms in post-revolution contexts --were used to symbolically mark and socially solidify the emerging communities of labor in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century France. More commonly, the names of Turner, Van Gennep, and Gluckman rather than Geertz have been cited when historians have attempted to grasp ritual (Geertz has been used by historians principally for his semiotic theory of culture (e.g. Clark 1983, Medick 19871 , not for his gentle critique of functionalist analyses of ritual). Following from these 5 anthropological authors, historians have typically been interested in rituals such as the carnival or the charivari, in rites of inversion or status reversal. Some historians have accepted the functionalist undergirding of anthropological writing about these rituals, concurring at least to some extent that rituals, in Gluckman's terms, "obviously include a protest against the established order" (but) "are intended to preserve and strengthen the established order (1965:109)." As Natalie Davis puts it, rituals "are ultimately sources of order and stability in a hierarchical society. They can clarify the structure by the process of reversing it. They can provide an expression of, and a safety valve for, conflicts within the system. They can correct and relieve the system when it has become authoritarian. But, so it is argued, they do not question
the basic order of the society itself. They can renew the system, but they cannot change it (~a v i s , 1965:130) ."
From a * textual perspective, Stephen Greenblatt has recognized that the anxiety about royal authority induced by Shakespeare in such plays as Richard I 1 and Henry V serves only in the end to enhance -A the power of authority; as he says "actions that should have the effect of ,radically undermining authority turn out to be the props of that authority," (~ollimore and Sinfield 1985; 40) .
Returning again to the Carnival, many historians have recognized in it something more than this, seizing on the prepolitical elements of class struggle and contestation, concentrating on the unsettling and disorderly aspects of the periodic inversion. However, in so doing they for the most have 6 had to suspend the teleological framing they might perhaps have rather recorded as critics of the social order; rituals rarely became highly politicized, and often did lapse back into the social orders that produced them, whether or not that social order was reinforced or slightly shaken as a result. Subversion was either contained, or transformed into order.
Indeed, in literary studies, which since the translation of Bakhtin's extraordinary book on Rabelais in 1968 has become even more carnavalesque than social history, the relation between periodic disorder and subversion on the one hand and order and containment on the other has been widely debated. Terry Eagleton is one of many critics of Bakhtin who thinks that Bakht in's celebration of the political potential and meaning of the carnival is misguided (Eagleton 1981:148 ):
Indeed carnival is so vivaciously celebrated that the necessary political criticism is almost too obvious to make. Carnival, after all, is a licensed affair in every sense, a permissable rupture of hegemony, a contained popular blow-off disturbing and relatively ineffectual as a revolutionary work of art. As Shakespeare's Olivia remarks, there is no slander in an allowed fool.
Be this as it may, it is in fact striking how frequently violent social clashes apparently coincided with carnival. And while carnival was always licensed, not all that happened in carnival was similarly licensed. Carnival was socially dangerous, semiotically demystifying, and culturally disrespectful, even though it often confirmed authority, renewed social relations, and was rarely either politicized or progressive (see Stallybross and White 1986) .
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In all these debates the question whether ritual can occasion, or serve as the occasion, for resistance is read in terms of one specific form of ritual and one particular kind of resistance. We hear only about the carnival or the charivari, about rituals that involve reversal and inversion, not about rituals that are about power/authority of both secular and sacred kinds. And we evaluate the politics of ritual only in terms of a discourse on resistance that seeks out contestatory and confrontational upsurges by the lower classes. It is perhaps no accident that Natalie Davis was less affected by these discursive blinkers than many of her contemporaries since her most critical discussion of the carnival concerns the status of women, who could not participate in public and politicized moments of confrontation, consigned as they were to the private, the domestic, and the particular. A concern with gender issues has led some writers to a critique of the virile assumptions underlying most writings on resistance (see O'Hanlon 1987).
Meanwhile, the move among anthropologists from symbolic analysis to practice theory has led to increasing focus on both the everyday and the non-ritual. Jean Comaroff, an anthropologist who has worked among the Tshidi of southern Africa and who was clearly deeply influenced by the practice theory of Bourdieu, turned to the everyday for a sense of the repressed and oppressed tensions characteristic of a system of violently established and maintained hegemony such as exists in south Africa. She found that, while awareness of oppression obviously runs deep, reaction may appear erratic, diffuse, and difficult to characterize. It is here that we must look beyond the conventionally explicit domains of 'political action' and 'consciousness'; for, when expressions of dissent are prevented from attaining the level of open discourse, a subtle but systematic breach of authoritative cultural codes might make a statement of protest which, by virtue of being rooted in a shared structural predicament and experience of dispossession, conveys an unambiguous message " (1985: 196) .
But the message is ambiguous, and anthropologists are still struggling to open up theoretical and empirical spaces for culturally constituted counter-hegemonies.
Among historians, a concern with the social has also led to a concern with the everyday, and social historians interested in a social history of confrontation have redefined their categories of the political and 'the confrontational. Alf Ludtke exemplifies this trend in his writing on workers movements and protests in imperial Germany. As he writes in a recent essay: "My focus will be on the total spectrum of expressions and daily assertions by individuals as well as by different groups and classes. I will emphasize not simply the ways in which people tried to raise demands or resist the demands of others, but also those modes of self-reliance whereby (in theoretical terms) people reappropriated these constraints and pressures --the specific, even peculiar, pratices whereby individuals handled their anxieties and desires. I wish to transgress and then blur the usual boundaries between political and private." (1985, 304) .
Elsewhere Ludtke writes that protests should be "regarded as occasional manifestations of a wide complex of structured processes and situations" and that "research into traces of suppressed needs should not be confined to manifest expressions of dissatisfaction, opposition, and resistance". (n.d.., 4). In this turn to the "everyday," ritual has too often been left out of the picture. However, ritual is not just a dramatic event, but a vital component of everyday experience.2
As we increasingly, and from differing perspectives, examine ordinary life, the fixtures of ordinariness thus give way to fractures, and we see that struggle is everywhere, even where it is least dramatic, and least visible (see de Certeau 1984.) Struggle becomes visible where previously we could not see it, a trope for a critical vision of the world. Consensus is no longer assumed unless proven otherwise, but even more unsettling for our social science, rebellion and resistance can no longer be order is an ideological tool which works to suppress or contain disorder and subversion.
Ironically, many current understandings of discursive domination (following from Foucault) or hegemony (following from Gramsci) are at least in part informed by notions of order that seem antipathetic to the posture of critique, for our notions of power appear both totalizing and a priori. "Power" is virtually synonomous with order. But in denaturalizing order, we must also denaturalize power, attending to its own fissures and dispersals.
Prakash has argued in this volume that we should not see resistance as a pure counterpart to power, and his warning serves to underscore the dangers of reifying our concepts of struggle.
It follows that order can be seen as an effect of power rather than its condition, thus liberating resistance from the (teleological) requirement that it establish a new order in order to be recognized as significant. But power is neither a cause nor a first principle; it is, rather, a relation, or rather an endless series of relations. In the concerns of this volume, we should remember that although struggle may always, as Foucault suggests, be interior to power, it (as our current preoccupation) can seriously subvert our normal assumptions, about both power and order (Foucault 1980: 94-97 ).
In the study of rural India, anthropology has provided most of our social scientific terms of reference. And in anthropology Perhaps therefore it comes as no surprise that writers like James Scott (1985) , who has made an important and eloquent plea for the study of everyday forms of peasant resistance, ignores the possibility that ritual could constitute an important site of resistance.
Partly this reveals his basic economistic assumptions, but in part this is because he is suspicious of ritual. In a long and rich book he makes only two brief references to rituals of status reversal, and several other references to ritual as something which is constitutive of community. Scott is therefore typical of how writers concerned with resistance themselves accept with little modification the ~urkheimian foundations of our social scientific conceptions of ritual.
However, Jean Comaroff among others has argued that ritual need not be about order and domination alone. She has found, at least in her work on southern Africa that ritual provides an appropriate medium through which the values and structures of a contradictory world may be addressed and manipulated .... The widespread syncretistic movements that have accompanied capitalist penetration into the Third World are frequently also subversive bricolages; that is, they are motivated by an opposition to the dominant system. While they have generally lacked the degree of self-consciousness of some religious or aesthetic movements, or of the marginal youth cultures of the modern West, they are nevertheless a purposive attempt to defy the authority of the hegemonic order...Such exercises do more than just express revolt; they are also more than mere acts of self-representation. Rather, they are at once both expressive and pragmatic, for they aim to change the real world by inducing transformations in the world of symbol and rite.
It is this mode of situating ritual practice and ideology in a world of hegemony and struggle in which representation itself is one of the most contested resources which I follow in this paper.
But I also seek to go further, as also to start with a more basic premise. I will not evaluate ritual practice on the basis of whether or not it aims to change the real world, however much it may lack self-consciousness. Rather, I will look at traditional village rituals in India that at face value have the effect of restoring social relations and upholding relations of authority both within the village and between it and the larger political unit of the kingdom or later state. And I will seek to determine if the way in which order and disorder have been narrativized as basic components.of ritual practice is in fact adequate to the multiple foci and forms of disorder as I 13 encountered them. For anthropologists have not only viewed ritual as merely a sociological mechanism for the production of order, but also as a cosmological and symbolic site for the containment of chaos and the regeneration of the world (as we, or they, know it).
Elsewhere ( that the festival on which I had such exquisite detail had not taken place for seven years, and that no one in the village had any genuine expectation that it would take place this year.
Most good fieldwork stories are similarly allegorized. We begin with calm self-confidence, our initial assumptions and convictions yet unchecked by the chaotic realities and serendipities of the field. We then find ourselves in some disastrous predicament which, in unsettling us (and sometimes them), enables us to cross the fault line of cultural difference, to familiarize ourselves with the concerns and logics of new social terrains, to achieve new forms of communion with our anthropological subjects, to achieve wisdom. In fact, at the The struggle between the service and dominant groups was a struggle over authority, and thus had its most visible and important expression in the Aiyanar ritual, which itself resisted bureaucratic appropriation by the new Brahman-British religious sensibility (though it succumbed to the bureaucratic definition of the inam).
As it turned out, the Diwan was less zealous than the Diwan Peishkar to upset the local structure of authoritative relations The terracotta animals were then installed in front of the temple. A grand puja was held to Aiyanar. The Velar priests offered tamarind rice, broke coconuts, and then showed the light, after which they offered ash to the worshippers. Then the pujaris left the Aiyanar shrine, shutting its doors. Aiyanar was said to be vegetarian, and ought not the see the sacrifice to Karuppar, the fierce black god whose shrine is always next to Aiyanar.
Moving to Karuppar, the priests performed puja again. The villagers surged forward en masse to obtain some ash. One of the priests laid a stone a few yards in front of the Karuppar temple.
The villagers assembled in a circle; finally a goat was brought forward, and judged proper. The fifth camiyati came forward Greenblatt has noted that, "the theatre elicits from us complicity rather than belief (1988: 119) ." But in rural southern India there were elements of both complicity and belief;
there were roles and masquerades that depended on far more than skilful artifice and conceit. This was "theater lived" not "theater played," as Greenblatt observed when citing an ethnographic example (1988: 111) . But even this opposition does not capture the full power of this ritual experience. For there was the possibility that something could go wrong, and this provided an urgency and unpredictability to the drama that renders a theatrical metaphor too dramatic and possibly sacriligious. One of the inescapable implications of the camiyati's predicament --the risk that possession could be inauthentic --was that all agency and all representation in the ritual was at risk as well. Identity was most fragile at the moment of its transformation and multiple reference. And the risk that the possessed might be faking it no doubt raised the possibility that the headman, whose authority and connections with the king were in the festival both celebrated and renewed, might also be faking it. After all, every one knew (though at the time I did not) that the headman claimed a sovereignty over the entire village that was not granted by the rival shepherds.
Thus, participation in the festival was highly politicized.
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Indeed, even the role of the lord was thus politicized; on whose side was which god on? But it was the compelling, contestable, and dangerous components of the ritual drama that also raised the stakes; the spectators did not simply gaze, they vied with each other to participate more actively and more centrally in the festival, to interlocute the camiyatis, to see the cutting of the goat, and to collect and consume the prasada --the transubstantiated return --of the lord. They also vied with one another to celebrate, to control, and to interpret the ritual.
I have given just a few illustrations to suggest what I might mean by the subversive nature of ritual practice and discourse. I will close with one last observation. Each ritual event is patterned activity to be sure, but it is also invented anew as it happens. When I witnessed one festival, there was frequent confusion about what was to be done. At one point a participant in the festival leaned over to me, realizing that I had seen many similar festivals, and asked me, what I thought they should do next. At the time, I thought that I was already intruding too much on the authenticity of the ritual event, and that to offer an opinion --and by the way I did have one --would be to go across the fragile threshold of legitimate participation implied in the oxymoronic motto of anthropology: participant observation. But I was wrong, for the authenticity of the event was inscribed in its performance, not in some time and custom sanctioned version of the ritual. And the authenticity of the Aiyanar festival was in particular inscribed in its uncertainty and its contestability. Even when it didn't actually take place.
